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Summary. The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred 
Nobel 2012 was awarded jointly to Alvin E. Roth and Lloyd S. Shapley for their contribu-
tions to the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design. The theory of 
stable allocations consists of a family of models that study assignment problems in which 
two disjoint sets of agents (or a set of agents and a set of objects) have to be matched. 
For example, men to women, workers to firms, students to schools, or patients to live 
donor kidneys. A matching is stable if no subset of agents can improved upon their 
proposed matches by rematching only among themselves. Stability is an essential 
property if matching is voluntary. The practice of market design consists of applying 
those two-sided matching models to specific assignment problems with the aim of 
proposing improvements on how they are solved. This paper presents a brief description 
of the academic career of the laureates and describes their contributions by presenting 
the most basic two-sided matching model and some of its market design applications, 
including the organization of a centralized system to propose kidney transplantations to 
use kidneys of live donors that are incompatible with their respective patients, the yearly 
assignment of North-American medical students to hospital internship programs, and 
children to schools in cities such as Boston and New York. [Contrib Sci 11(1): 103-112 
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The Laureates
Alvin Roth was born in New York city, NY, on December 18, 
1951. He graduated from Columbia University in 1971 (when 
he was 19 years old!) with a degree in Operations Research. 
He obtained his Ph.D. in Operations Research from Stanford 
University in 1974 under the supervision of Robert B. Wilson. 
His first two jobs were at the Departments of Economics 
at the University of Illinois (from 1974 to 1982) and at the 
University of Pittsburgh (from 1982 to 1998). In 1998 he 
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moved to Harvard University with a joint appointment from 
the Economics Department and the Harvard Business School. 
He stayed there until the beginning of 2013 when he moved 
to the Economics Department at Stanford University. During 
this period at Harvard University he supervised a large group 
of Ph.D. students, most of whom work now at the best uni-
ver sities in the USA and Europe (Fig. 1).
Roth thesis was on von Neumann and Morgenstern stable 
sets. His research interests have been wide and moved very 
consistently to include axiomatic bargaining, experimental 
economics, learning in non-cooperative games, the theory of 
stable allocations in matching markets, and market design. 
According to the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences the 
prize was awarded to him for his research on the last two 
areas, although he has made fundamental contributions in 
the other ones [5,12,17].
1
Lloyd Shapley was born in Cambridge, MA, on June 
2, 1923, and died in Tucson, AZ, on March 12, 2016. After 
serving in the Army Air Corps in Chengdu, China, during the 
WWII, he went to Harvard University, where he graduated in 
1948 with a degree in mathematics. He obtained his Ph.D. 
in mathematics from Princeton University in 1953 under 
the supervision of Albert W. Tucker. He has had only two 
affiliations: at RAND Corporation (from 1954 to 1981) and 
at the Departments of Mathematics and Economics at the 
University of California, Los Angeles, since 1981 (Fig. 1).
 Shapley’s doctoral thesis was on additive and non-additive 
set functions. He has made fundamental contributions in 
all areas of game theory; for instance to the theory of the 
Core, the Shapley value, repeated and stochastic games, the 
potential of a game and the theory of stable allocations in 
matching markets. Many game theorists thought that the 
fact that Shapley had not been awarded the Nobel Prize in 
Economics yet was a sad omission. We are now pleased that 
this was corrected in 2012.
The awarding of the 2012 Nobel Prize to both Roth and 
Shapley may be seen as recognizing two complementary sides 
of a research: Shapley for his theoretical contributions to the 
theory of stable allocations in two-sided matching problems 
[7,22] and Roth for his applications of this theory to improve the 
functioning of institutions solving two-sided assignment real-life 
problems [15,18,20].
2 Roth and Shapley did not write jointly, but 
Roth has been closely following Shapley’s research as his fourth 
paper [11] and his fourth book show [16].
David Gale (1921–2008) made also fundamental con-
tributions to the theory of stable allocations and he might 
Fig. 1. Alvin E. Roth (left), and Lloyd S. Shapley (right), awarded with the Nobel 
Prize in Economics 2012.
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1 The first paper is still his most cited paper in SCOPUS.
2 Roth and Sotomayor (1990) contains a masterful review of all matching literature from 1962 to 1990 and it is still the best gateway to the theory and 
applications of two-sided matching problems.
105
Massó
CONTRIBUTIONS to SCIENCE 11:103-112 (2015) www.cat-science.cat
have been also been awarded with the prize if he had he been 
alive in 2012. He was born in New York city, NY, on December 
13, 1921 and died in Berkeley (California) on March 7, 2008. 
He obtained his Ph.D. from Princeton University in 1949 
under the supervision of Albert W. Tucker (1905–1995). He 
had two main affiliations, the first at Brown University (from 
1954 to 1981) and the second at the University of California, 
Berkeley, (from 1965 to 2008). He made also relevant 
contributions to mathematical economics and game theory, 
and his work is still a very useful reference on the applications 
of linear programming to economics [6].
The theory of stable allocations and the 
practice of market design
Participants in some markets cannot be divided a priori 
between buyers and sellers. If the price of a good changes 
sufficiently, a participant can be a seller and a buyer in a few 
minutes of difference. Stocks are clear examples of goods 
exchanged in such markets. However, there are many other 
markets without this property: participants are either buyers 
or sellers, independently of the price of the good. Physical 
or legal characteristics of the participants make them to 
be in one, and only one side of the market. For instance, a 
university professor cannot become a university, even after a 
dramatic decline of the professors’ wage, nor the university 
can become a university professor after its increase.
There are many two-sided assignment problems, not 
necessarily solved through markets, in which participants are 
divided a priori between two disjoint sets, for instance, men 
and women, workers and firms, and students and colleges. 
The assignment problem is precisely to match each participant 
in one of the two sets with a participant in the other set (or 
to remain unmatched) taking into account the preferences 
that each participant in one set has on the participants on 
the other set (plus the prospect of remaining unmatched). 
But the matching has to be bilateral: if a is matched with 
b, b is matched with a. Moreover, those problems have 
often two additional properties that distinguish them from 
conventional markets. First, the matching between two 
participants requires mutual agreement: if a chooses to be 
matched with b, a has to be chosen by b. Second, prices do 
not play any role to facilitate the matching and to resolve the 
potential disequilibrium of the mutual wills.
Two-sided matching models formalize the main 
charac teristics of these assignment problems. Shapley 
contributed to the development of the earlier stages of 
this theory, specifically by proposing the notion of stability 
of an allocation as the relevant property whenever the 
assignment has to be voluntary [7]. An assignment (or a 
matching) between the two sets of participants is stable 
at a preference profile if: (a) all participants are either 
unmatched or matched with a participant that is strictly 
preferred to remaining unmatched and (b) there is no pair 
of participants that are not matched with each other but 
they would prefer to be so rather than staying with the 
partner proposed by the assignment.
Although Roth also has fundamental theoretical con-
tributions to two-sided matching models he has been the 
founder and main contributor to market design. This area 
uses two-sided matching models and other tools to analyze 
practical assignment problems. It restricts the attention to 
specific situations by modifying the general and abstract 
model to incorporate the specific details of the particular 
problem under consideration. Hence, it obtains conclusions 
that do not have general validity (of course) but that, by 
taking into account the institutional details of the problem 
at hand, allows the researcher to perform a deeper analysis 
and recommend possible changes to improve the way 
that specific assignment problems are solved in practice. 
For instance, Roth and his collaborators have proposed 
substantial modifications on the solutions of problems like 
the yearly assignment of North-American medical interns 
to hospital internship programs, children to schools in 
cities like Boston and New York, or the organization of a 
centralized system to propose kidney transplantations of 
live donors that are incompatible with their respective and 
loved patients.
In the remaining of the paper, instead of presenting 
different models of two-sided assignment problems and 
their applications as practices of market design, I will 
restrict myself to present some examples. I will start with 
an application, describing (in my view) one of the most 
interesting practices of market design: the kidney exchange 
problem. To do so, I will present the adaptation of the 
Gale’s top trading cycle algorithm as the best solution to 
solve kidney exchange problems [20], with some references 
to the Spanish case. I will also present the notion of 
stable allocations in the basic marriage model [7] and the 
main results in terms of the strategic incentives faced by 
participants in centralized two-sided matching markets. 
I will mention two other applications of this theory: the 
yearly assignment of medical students to hospital internship 
programs in North-America and the yearly assignment of 
students to schools in Boston and New York cities.
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Kidney exchange
There are two treatments for patients with renal disease: 
dialysis and transplantation. Since dialysis requires a strong 
dependence and has many side effects (physical as well as 
psychological), transplantation is considered the best treat-
ment. Kidneys for transplantation come from either deceased 
or living donors. The first successful kidney transplantation 
took place on December 23, 1954 in Boston. It was done be-
tween two identical twins (to eliminate the immune reac-
tion) and performed, among others, by Joseph E. Murray 
(1919–2012), J. Hartwell Harrison (1909–1984), and John P. 
Merrill (1917–1984).3 The patient survived eight years after 
the transplantation. At the end of the last century, and after 
the improvement in immunosuppressive therapies, the ma-
jority of transplanted kidneys in many countries were from 
deceased donors; for instance, in 1999 in Spain less than 1% 
of all kidney transplants were from living donors (only 17 
among 2023). However, there is a unanimous agreement that 
the quality and success-rate of kidney transplants from living 
donors are greater than those from deceased ones. In par-
ticular, the likelihood that the transplanted kidney survives 5 
years is 0.87 if it comes from live donors and 0.80 if it comes 
from deceased donors, and the likelihood that the recipient 
will survive 5 years is 0.93 and 0.86, respectively. Further-
more, promoting the donation of kidneys from living donors 
may help solve the shortage of kidneys for transplantation. 
Indeed, all countries with active transplantation programs 
suffer from shortage of kidneys.
Almost everywhere the average time that a patient has to 
stay in the waiting list for a kidney transplant is well above 
two years. In addition, increasing life expectancy as well as 
the decrease in mortality due to car and motorcycle acci-
dents has made the shortage even more severe. For all these 
reasons, in the last ten years, many countries are promoting 
living donation; for instance, in 2011 in Spain already more 
than 12% of all kidney transplants were from living donors 
(312 among 2498).
In the direct donation, the patient receives, if compatible, 
one of the two kidneys from a relative or friend (usually, the 
spouse and siblings of the patient). The most basic incompat-
ibilities are blood and tissue type (the latter is related to ge-
netics that produce immune reaction), although the age of 
the kidney is also relevant for the graft kidney survival. But if 
the kidney is not compatible, the transplant is not possible 
and the donor’s kidney is removed from the system. It is esti-
mated that approximately one third of patients with a friend 
or family donor are excluded from the system due to differ-
ent incompatibilities. 
Until very recently this was the only live donation that 
was taking place, and there was no system to take advantage 
of rejected donors, which were simply sent home. In 1986, 
Felix T. Rapaport (1929–2001) was the first to propose kidney 
exchanges from living donors. The idea is simple: suppose 
that one day a nephrologist receives a patient accompanied 
by a relative who is willing to donate a kidney. Unfortunately, 
the analysis shows that they are incompatible. The next day, 
the same doctor receives another patient-donor pair who are 
also incompatible. But each patient is compatible with the 
donor of the other pair, and hence, a kidney exchange is pos-
sible (in this case, by satisfying a cycle of length two). Or even 
longer cycles involving three or more incompatible patient-
donor pairs could be undertaken.
A kidney exchange problem consists of a set of incompati-
ble patient-donor pairs together with a profile of ordered lists 
of all donors’ kidneys, one list for each patient. Formally, let 
N = {1,...,n } be the set of patients and let  K = { 1,..., nk k } be 
the set of live donors kidneys. Each patient i N∈  has a donor 
whose kidney ik  is not compatible with i . Thus, 
{ (1, ),..., ( , )k n k } is the set of n  incompatible patient-donor 
pairs. Each patient i N∈  has a preference order (a strict) rank-
ing iP  of all donors kidneys. For instance, with 4n = , 
indicates that, for patient 3, 2k  and 4k  are two compatible 
kidneys, 2k  is better than 4k , and 1k  is not compatible (the 
ordering between incompatible kidneys is irrelevant). A pa-
tient’s ordered list of all kidneys (from the best to the worst) 
reflects, according to the patient’s nephrologist, the ex-ante 
ordinal quality of the match between each kidney and the pa-
tient.
The market design question in this case is to determine a 
systematic way of selecting, for each kidney exchange prob-
3 Joseph E. Murray received the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 1990, jointly with E. Donnall Thomas, for their discoveries concerning organ and cell 
transplantation in the treatment of human disease.
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lem, a set of compatible transplants with some desirable 
properties. A set of compatible transplants can be represent-
ed by a matching : N Kα → , where ( ) ji kα =  means that if 
i j≠ , i  receives kidney jk  and if i j= , i  does not receive 
any kidney (and stays under dialysis waiting for a new run of 
the match). Note that the set of incompatible patient-donor 
pairs can be represented by the matching µ , where ( ) ii kµ =  
for all i N∈ . An instance of a kidney exchange problem is 
thus a tuple ( , , , )N K Pµ , where N  is the set of patients, K  
is the set of kidneys, µ  represents the set of incompatible 
patient-donor pairs and 1( ,..., )nP P P=  is the profile of 
agents preferences on K.4 Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver [20] 
study the kidney exchange problem and propose an adapta-
tion of the general model presented by Shapley and Scarf 
[22] as well as of an already known algorithm in matching 
theory to solve all kidney exchange problems. The algorithm 
is known as the Gale’s top trading cycle algorithm, and I will 
refer to it as the TTC algorithm.
Given a kidney exchange problem (remember, a set of in-
compatible patient-donor pairs and a profile of patients’ lists, 
each list ordering all donors’ kidneys) the TTC algorithm 
solves the problem (i.e., proposes a set of compatible trans-
plants) in stages. At each stage, the TTC algorithm roughly 
works as follows: (a) It constructs a graph whose nodes are 
the patient-donor pairs that have not yet been matched in 
the previous stages; (b) it directs the graph (a single arrow 
leaves from each node pointing to a node) by making that 
each patient points to the best kidney (according to his or-
dered list of kidneys) among those still present in the stage; 
(c) it identifies the nodes on the cycles of the directed graph; 
and (d) it satisfies the cycles, matching each patient of the 
nodes of the cycles to his pointed kidney. The TTC algorithm 
keeps identifying and satisfying successively the cycles along 
the stages.
Note that in each stage, there is always at least one cycle, 
if there are several cycles they do not intersect each other 
and a cycle may have a single node whose patient points to 
the kidney of his donor (obviously, since they are not compat-
ible, the patient in this case will not be transplanted and the 
patient will remain under dialysis). Thus, the input of the TTC 
algorithm is an instance of a kidney exchange problem and its 
output is a solution of the problem (i.e., a matching) that 
consists of a proposal of transplants based on the cycles 
identified along its stages. I denote by η  the matching repre-
senting the transplants proposed by the output of the TTC 
algorithm applied to the kidney exchange problem at hand. 
Example 1 below illustrates how the TTC algorithm works.5
Example 1. Let ( , , , )N K Pµ  be a kidney exchange prob-
lem with eight incompatible patient-donor pairs, ( ) ii kµ =  
for each 1,...,8i = , and the profile P  represented in Table 1 
below, where the kidneys inside an square in each agent’ 
preference list indicates the initial assignment µ  of agents 
to kidneys (Table 1). 
Figure 2 represents the three steps of the TTC algorithm 
applied to profile P  to obtain the assignment η .
The TTC algorithm has many desirable properties. First, it 
is individually rational: every patient that receives a kidney 
from another donor at the outcome of the TTC algorithm 
prefers this situation rather than not receiving a kidney and 
remaining under dialysis. Second, it is efficient: all patients 
cannot improve simultaneously; that is, if there is another set 
of transplants where one patient receives a strictly better 
kidney, then there must exist another patient that receives a 
strictly worse kidney. Third, the output of the TTC algorithm 
is a stable assignment (in game-theoretic terms, it belongs to 
the core of the kidney exchange problem): there is no subset 
of patient-donor pairs that, by reassigning only the kidneys of 
the donors of the patients in the subset, can obtain better 
kidneys; i.e., no subgroup of the patient-donor pairs (for ex-
ample those from a hospital, a city or a region) can object 
unanimously to the output of the TTC algorithm [22]. More-
over, the core of each kidney exchange problem is unique 
Table 1. Eight incompatible patient-donor pairs
4 Given , ,i j t N∈  and iP , I will write j i tk R k  to denote that either j tk k= or else j i tk P k .
5 Example 1, as well as Example 2, can be found in Massó [10].
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and coincides with the output of the TTC algorithm [19].6 
Fourth, the mechanism associated to the TTC algorithm is 
strategy-proof: no patient could obtain a strictly better kid-
ney by reporting (in fact, his nephrologist) a false ordered list 
of kidneys [14]. Furthermore, the mechanism that, for each 
kidney exchange problem, selects the output of the TTC algo-
rithm is the unique individually rational, efficient, and strate-
gy-proof mechanism [9]. Finally, the quality of the kidney re-
ceived by each patient in the output of the TTC algorithm 
depends positively on the quality of his kidney’s donor [19].
Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver have also reported some simu-
lations suggesting that the TTC algorithm performs well and 
that it can be applied to real kidney exchange problems, and 
indeed it is now used in most countries with kidney ex-
change programs [20].7 In addition, the paper has also trig-
gered an already long list of papers studying different issues 
related to the specific nature of the kidney exchange prob-
lem that may require to adapt the TTC algorithm. For in-
stance, (a) to deal with the increasing number of altruistic 
donors (called “good Samaritans”), whose kidney can be 
used to initiate chains (instead of cycles) of transplants. On 
February 18, 2012, The New York Times published an article 
entitled “60 Lives, 30 Kidneys, All Linked ” describing a chain 
of 30 transplants initiated one year earlier by a good Samar-
itan. (b) The consequences of requiring alternative incentive 
properties (weaker than strategy-proofness) when patients 
(their nephrologists) submit the ranked list of all donors’ kid-
neys. (c) The presence of patients with several potential do-
nors. (d) Ethical issues related with the ex-ante worse situa-
tion faced by O blood-type patients since they can only re-
ceive kidneys from O blood-type donors. (e) The effects of 
considering explicitly the dynamic feature of the problem, 
where the database of pairs keeps changing by the entrance 
and exit of patient-donor pairs. In any case, kidney exchange 
has become a natural and successful market design applica-
tion of the theory of stable allocations to help human beings 
to live longer and better. Roth and Shapley’s contributions 
have made it possible.
The Theory of Stable Allocations
Following Gale and Shapley’s metaphor [7] we will use 
the marriages between men and women as the reference 
example to describe a basic matching problem.8 Let M =  
{ 1,..., nm m } be the set of men and let W = { 1,..., nw w } be the 
set of women. The set of agents is N M W=  . We assume 
that each men m M∈  has a strict preference (a ranking) mP  
on the set of women and the prospect of remaining un-
matched, that for convenience we identify as being matched 
to himself. That is, mP  is a complete, antisymmetric and 
transitive binary relation on the set W  { m }. Given m M∈  
and , 'w w W∈ , we will write 'mwP w  and mmP w  to denote 
that m  prefers to be matched to w  rather than to 'w  and to 
be unmatched instead of being matched to w , respectively. 
Similarly, each women w W∈  has a strict preference Pw  on 
6 Note that, by considering the set of all agents and all singleton sets, if an assignment belongs to the core it has to be efficient and individually rational.
7 They promoted, together with Dr. Francis Delmonico and Susan Saidman, the New England Program for Kidney Exchange (NEPKE). Many countries have now 
their corresponding centralized programs, for instance, Spain, The Netherlands, The United Kingdom, Italy and South Korea.
8 The two basic characteristics of the problem are that agent’s preferences are ordinal and matching is one-to-one.
Fig. 2. The three steps of the TTC algorithm applied to obtain the assignment η.
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the set M  { w }, where w  in the ranking represents the 
prospect, for w , of remaining unmatched. Given w W∈ and 
, 'm m M∈ , we will write 'wmP m  and wwP m  to denote that 
w prefers to be matched to m  rather than to 'm  and to be 
unmatched instead of being matched to m , respectively. A 
(preference) profile is a list of preferences 
1 1( ,..., ; ,..., )n mn m w wP P P P P= , one for each agent. A market 
(or matching problem) is a triple ( , , )M W P , where M  is the 
set of men, W  is the set of women and P  is a profile. Ex-
ample 2 below contains an instance of a market that will be 
used later on.
Example 2. Let ( , , )M W P  be the market where M =
{ 1 2, 3 4 5, , ,m m m m m }, W = { 1 2 3 4, , ,w w w w }, and P  is defined in 
Table 2 where agents’ preferences are columns and each col-
umn indicates the corresponding agent’s preference in de-
creasing order, for instance, 1 5 2mw P w  and 5 5 3mm P w .
The assignment problem consists of matching each man 
with at most a woman and each woman with at most a man 
with the properties that the matching is bilateral and agents 
may remain unmatched. Formally,
Definition 1: A matching (for market ( , , )M W P ) is a 
mapping : M W M Wµ →   such that:
(a) for each m M∈ , ( )m Wµ ∈  { m },
(b) for each w W∈ , ( )w Mµ ∈  { w }, and
(c) for each pair ( , )m w M W∈ × , ( )m wµ =  if and only if 
( )m mµ = . 
      Figure 3 illustrates a matching for this market.
A matching is stable if it is individually rational and no pair 
of agents prefer each other rather than the partners pro-
posed to each of them by the matching. Formally, 
Definition 2: A matching µ  is stable at P  if
(a) for each m M∈ , m( m )R mµ ,9
(b) for each w W∈ , w( w )R wµ , and
(c) there is no pair ( , )m w M W∈ ×  such that ( )mwP mµ  and 
( )wmP wµ .
The matching µ  in Fig. 2 is not stable at profile P  of Ex-
ample 2 since 2 1 3 1( )mw P w mµ=  and 1 2 5 2( )wm P m wµ= . Fix 
M and W . Given P , let ( )S P  be the set of stable mat-
chings at P . Gale and Shapley state and prove that the set of 
Fig. 3. A matching for the market of Example 2.
Table 2. In the columns, the agents’ preference are listed. Each column indicates the corresponding agent’s preference 
in decreasing order
9 Given agents , ,x y z N∈  we write yxR z  to denote that either x z=  or else yxP z ; namely, either x  and z  are the same agent or else y strictly prefers to 
be matched to x  rather than to z .
10 Moreover, it coincides with the core of the one-to-one matching problem; namely, intermediate coalitions of agents have no additional blocking power.
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stable matchings is always non-empty [7].10 Formally,
Theorem 1: Let P be a profile. Then, ( )S P  is non-empty.
 
Gale and Shapley prove that, for any P , the set ( )S P is non-
empty by showing that it contains two stable matchings, the 
men-optimal stable matching (denoted by Mµ ) and the wom-
en-optimal stable matching (denoted by Wµ ) [7]. The two 
matchings have the properties that for any stable matching 
( )S Pµ ∈  the following two conditions hold: (a) for all m M∈ , 
( ) ( ) ( )M m m Wm R m R mµ µ µ  and (b) for all w W∈ , 
W w w M( w )R ( w )R ( w )µ µ µ ; namely, all men agree that the part-
ner that they receive at ( )M Wµ µ  is the best (worst) among all 
partners that they receive at any stable matching and, simulta-
neously, all women agree that the partner that they receive at 
( )W Mµ µ  is the best (worst) among all partners that they re-
ceive at any stable matching.11 Gale and Shapley propose two 
versions of the deferred acceptance algorithm (DAA) to com-
pute the two optimal stable matchings Mµ  and Wµ  [7]. I de-
scribe the version of the algorithm in which men make offers 
to women, denoted by DAAM (the other is symmetric, replac-
ing the role of men and women and it is denoted by DAAW). At 
any step of the DAAM, each man offers himself to his most-
preferred woman amongst the set of women who have not 
already rejected him, while each woman accepts the most-
preferred men amongst all men whose proposals along the 
algorithm she has not rejected yet. The algorithm terminates 
when no woman rejects a man. It turns out that the outcome 
of the DAAM is Mµ  and the outcome of the DAAW is Wµ . 
Table 3 summarizes the 4 steps of the DAAM applied to the 
market ( , , )M W P  of Example 2, where m w→  represents 
an offer of m  to w , Yes means that w  accepts it, and No 
that w  rejects it. 
Table 4 describes the unique step of the DAAW applied to 
the market (M, W, P) of Example 2. Observe that M Wµ µ≠  
and that 5 5 5( ) ( )M Ww w wµ µ= = .12
Roth has made relevant contributions to the study of the 
strategic incentives induced by the DAAs when they are un-
derstood as direct revelation mechanisms.13 Moreover, he 
has proposed modifications of some mechanisms used to 
solve real-life assignment problems. Some of the modifica-
tions are partially driven by the aim of fixing mechanisms 
that induce wrong strategic incentives to agents. At the end 
of this section I will be a bit more specific about two of these 
modifications. But first, to consider the strategic incentives 
   Table 3. Four steps of the deferred acceptance algorithm in which men make offers to women, applied to the market (M, W, P)
   of Example 2
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Final
1 1m w→  Yes 1 1m w→  Yes 1 1m w→  Yes 1 1m w→  Yes
1 1( )M m wµ =  
2 4m w→  Yes 2 4m w→  No 2 2m w→  Yes 2 2m w→  Yes
2 2( )M m wµ =
3 4m w→  No 3 3m w→  Yes 3 3m w→  Yes 3 3m w→  Yes
3 3( )M m wµ =
4 1m w→  No 4 4m w→  Yes 4 4m w→  Yes 4 4m w→  Yes
4 4( )M m wµ =
5 1m w→  No 5 2m w→  Yes 5 2m w→  No 5 4m w→  No
5 5( )M m wµ =
Table 4. Unique step of the DAAW applied to the market (M, W, P)  of 
Example 2
Step 1 Final
1 2w m→  Yes
2 3w m→  Yes
3 4w m→  Yes
4 1w m→  Yes
11 Ref. [8] shows that ( )S P is a (dual) complete lattice with the unanimous partial ordering of men (women) M≥  ( W≥ ), where for any , ' ( )S Pµ µ ∈ , M 'µ µ≥  if 
and only if ( ) '( )mm R mµ µ ( 'Wµ µ≥  if and only if ( ) '( )ww R wµ µ ). Moreover, 'Mµ µ≥ if and only if ' Wµ µ≥ . Then, Mµ is the supremum and Wµ is the infimum 
of the set ( )S P  according to M≥ , and Wµ is the supremum and Mµ is the infimum of the set ( )S P  according to W≥ . 
12 The following property of the set of stable matchings ( )S P always holds. For any agent x M W∈   if ( )S Pµ ∈  and ( )x xµ =  then, for all ' ( )S Pµ ∈ , 
'( )x xµ = . Namely, to be unmatched is a global property of the set of stable matchings.
13 A direct revelation mechanism asks each agent to report his preferences and proposes a matching depending on the declared profile of preferences.
1 2( )W w mµ =
2 3( )W w mµ =
3 4( )W w mµ =
4 5( )W w mµ =
5 5( )W w mµ =
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faced by participants in these markets, observe that whether a 
matching is stable depends on the agents’ preferences. But 
each agent’s preferences are private information and hence, 
they have to be elicited by a mechanism. Fix the sets M and 
W. Let M be the set of all matchings among M and W and let 
P  be the set of all preference profiles. A social choice func-
tion is a mapping f :P → M selecting, for each preference 
profile P ∈P, a matching f ( P )∈M. Given a social choice 
function f :P → M, a profile P ∈P  and an agent x M W∈   
we denote by xf ( )P  the partner assigned to x  by the so-
cial choice function f at profile P (i.e., xf ( )P ) ≡ f ( )( )P x , 
because f ( )P  is the matching selected by f at P ). Given 
agent x M W∈  , a profile P ∈P  and a preference xP' de-
note by ( xP' , xP− ) the new profile obtained from P after re-
placing xP by xP' in P . Agent x M W∈  manipulates the 
social choice function f :P → M if there exist P ∈P and
xP' such that
x x
x x x x xf ( P' ,P )P f ( P ,P )− − ; namely, agent x  
(with preference xP ) obtains an strictly preferred partner by 
reporting to f a false preference xP' . A social choice function 
f :P → M is strategy-proof if no agent can manipulate it.14 
A social choice function f :P → M is stable if it always selects 
stable matchings; namely, for all P ∈P, f ( ) ( )P S P∈ . Roth 
shows that strategy-proofness and stability are incompatible 
[13].
Proposition 1: There is no social choice function f : P → M 
that is simultaneously strategy-proof and stable [13]. 
     However, the two DAAs understood as social choice func-
tions induce good incentive properties to the side of the mar-
ket that makes the offers. To state that, let Mf :P → M be 
the social choice function that selects for each preference 
profile the men-optimal stable matching and let Wf :P → M 
be the social choice function that selects for each preference 
profile the women-optimal stable matching; namely, for each 
P ∈P, Mf ( ) = Mµ and Wf ( )P = Wµ . A social choice func-
tion f : P → M  is strategy-proof for the men if it can not be 
manipulated by any men and f : P → M is strategy-proof 
for the women if it can not be manipulated by any women. 
The following result may explain why these two social choice 
functions are used so widely to solve many real-life central-
ized two-sided matching problems.
Theorem 2: The social choice function Mf : P → M is 
strategy-proof for the men and the social choice function 
Wf : P → M is strategy-proof for the women [4,13].
Finally, I mention two successful market design applica-
tions of the theory of stable allocations. First, Roth [15] re-
ports that, since the academic year 1951–1952 (ten years 
earlier than Gale and Shapley’s paper [7]), the problem of 
matching each year medical students with hospital internship 
programs in North-America was solved by the Association of 
American Medical Colleges (AAMC) by asking to medical stu-
dents and hospital to report their ranked preferences lists and 
by applying to the declared preference profile the DAA in 
which hospitals make offers.
Before 1951, and as earlier as the beginning of the 20th 
century, the matching process had many problems. In particu-
lar, the market unraveled in the sense that hospitals were 
looking (and making offers in a decentralized setting) to medi-
cal students earlier and earlier while they were still at college, 
and needed almost two additional years of college before fin-
ishing. The AAMC tried to stop these practices without much 
success until 1953–1954 when the centralized ADD mecha-
nism was adopted under voluntary basis. The procedure 
worked well with high participation rates until the mid-1990’s 
(around 20,000 medical students were assigned yearly) when 
more couples where looking coordinately for hospitals locat-
ed in the same city, some links had to be done between differ-
ent subspecialties to fulfill the internship requirements, and 
students were arguing that the system was favoring hospitals 
and that they could “game the system” by reporting false pref-
erence lists. The AAMC asked Roth to modify the mechanism 
to fix those problems and he redesigned the algorithm to be 
able to accommodate them satisfactorily. In 1998 the match 
was completed using (with small modifications) the DAA in 
which students make offers [18]. This intervention may be 
seen as the first (conscious) practice of market design.
 Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez [3] used a two-sided match-
ing model to study the yearly problem of assigning students 
to public schools in a city. The main issue of the assignment 
problem is to let parents to choose the school of their chil-
dren. Boston and New York cities were using a centralized 
mechanism (known as the Boston mechanism) that is similar 
to the DAA but with the very important difference that provi-
14That is, truth-telling is a (weakly) dominant strategy in the game induced by the social choice function f .
15For instance, in the application of the DAA M  to the profile P  of Example 2, 3m  is assigned to 3w , his second choice, while in the outcome of the Boston 
mechanism he is unassigned (his worse choice). However, under the Boston mechanism 3m  could be assigned to 2w  by declaring, instead of 3Pm , any 
preference 3'P m  with 2w  as his top choice.
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sional matches along the application of the algorithm are 
made definitive, and hence, it was highly manipulable.15
Abdulkadiroğlu and others have reported that, following 
their advice, the two cities changed the assignment proce-
dure and replaced the Boston mechanism by the DAA in 
which students make offers [1,2]. Recently, many other cities 
are adopting the DAA to organize the assignment of their stu-
dents to public schools. 
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